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ABSTRACT
Rapid technology scaling, the main driver of the power and performance im-
provements of computing solutions, has also rendered our computing systems extremely
susceptible to transient errors called soft errors. Among the arsenal of techniques to
protect computation from soft errors, Control Flow Checking (CFC) based techniques
have gained a reputation of effective, yet low-cost protection mechanism. The basic
idea is that, there is a high probability that a soft-fault in program execution will even-
tually alter the control flow of the program. Therefore just by making sure that the
control flow of the program is correct, significant protection can be achieved. More
than a dozen techniques for CFC have been developed over the last several decades,
ranging from hardware techniques (CFCET [32], TTA [23], ASIS [8], W-D-P [22],
OSLC [20]), software techniques (CFCSS [29], ECCA [2], CEDA [42], ACCE [43],
YACCA [13], ACFC [44]), and hardware-software hybrid techniques (CFEDC [10],
CSM [45], SIS [37], Watchdog assists [35]) as well.
Our analysis shows that existing CFC techniques are not only ineffective in
protecting from soft errors, but cause additional power and performance overheads.
For this analysis, we develop and validate a simulation based experimental setup to
accurately and quantitatively estimate the architectural vulnerability of a program exe-
cution on a processor micro-architecture. We model the protection achieved by various
state-of-the-art CFC techniques in this quantitative vulnerability estimation setup, and
find out that software only CFC protection schemes (CFCSS [29], CFCSS+NA [5],
CEDA [42]) increase system vulnerability by 18% to 21% with 17% to 38% perfor-
mance overhead. Hybrid CFC protection (CFEDC [10]) increases vulnerability by
5%, while the vulnerability remains almost the same for hardware only CFC protection
(CFCET [32]); notwithstanding the hardware overheads of design cost, area, and power
incurred in the hardware modifications required for their implementations.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Continuous and exponential technology scaling for the last 5 decades has enabled us to
pack high-performance compute devices needing very little power, in small-size pack-
aging at affordable cost. This has set in motion the information revolution, and the
unprecedented integration of computing systems into our every-day life. However, a
negative consequence of technology scaling this is that the transistors within modern
(highly compact, and fast) processors have become extremely susceptible to soft er-
rors. Among the many sources of transient faults in the system (e.g., electrical noise,
external interference, cross-talk, etc.) charge carrying particles (alpha, low and high
energy neutrons, etc.) cause the majority of soft errors in electronic devices [21]. At
the current technology node, high-end embedded systems, e.g., smart-phones, tablets,
etc., incur a Soft Error Rate (SER) of about once-per-year, but is expected to increase
exponentially to once-per-day in a decade [18].
As a consequence, reliability is rapidly emerging as a primary design metric.
Over the years, several schemes have been developed to protect computing systems
from soft errors. Most protection schemes are built around time and/or space redun-
dancy. The idea is the perform a computation twice, and see if the results match. If
not, then must have been an error. These redundancy based protection schemes can and
have been developed at various levels of system design abstraction – from transistor
level [15, 27] to gate level [12, 40] to system level [41, 30, 26, 39, 17]. Although re-
dundancy based methods have been considered effective in providing system reliability,
they are generally considered to have high overhead. In particular, while it may be pos-
sible to minimize/hide the performance overhead of redundancy, the power overhead
of redundancy cannot be hidden.
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Figure 1: The mechanism of signature verification to detect control flow errors in
CFCSS.
As an alternative, there is a whole class of techniques called Control Flow
Checking (CFC) techniques. The key idea here is that the majority of soft errors af-
fecting program behavior eventually manifest in the form of errors in the program exe-
cution sequence. Thus, by making sure that the control flow of the program is correct,
significant protection can be achieved. CFC tecnniques can often be implemented with
much less overhead than full scale redundancy. For example, as shown in Figure 1, the
software-based CFC technique, CFCSS, adds some instructions to assign a variable to
a unique value (signature) in each basic block, and also adds instructions in each ba-
sic block to check if the control flow is coming from a legitimiate basic block. This is
achieved by comparing the value of the signature variable, held in the runtime signature
register G. Thus a software CFC can be implemented by adding only a few instructions
per basic block.
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Owing to the belief that CFC will provide high levels of protection at rela-
tively low overheads, more than a dozen proposals have been made on different ways
to implement CFC. The arsenal of control flow based soft error protection techniques
developed span across design layers from hardware [32, 23, 8, 22, 20], software [29,
42, 28, 2, 43, 13, 44], and hardware-software hybrid techniques [10, 45, 37, 35].
In this thesis, we develop a simulation based tool that can quantitatively and
accurately estimate the architectural vulnerability of execution. We further model and
estimate the protection achieved by the various CFC techniques. Our results reveal that
CFC techniques do not protect execution from soft errors, but incur additional power
and performance overheads. In particular, software only CFC protection schemes
(CFCSS[29], CFCSS+NA[5], CEDA[42]) increase system vulnerability by 18% to
21% with 17% to 38% performance overhead. Hybrid CFC protection (CFEDC[10])
increases vulnerability by 5%, while the vulnerability remains almost the same for
hardware only CFC protection (CFCET[32]); notwithstanding the hardware overheads
of design cost, area, and power incurred in the hardware modifications required for
their implementations.
Although the previous papers that proposed the CFC techniques demonstrated
the effectiveness of their approach, their measurement was flawed. In all the previous
papers, researchers have performed targeted fault injection – in the sense that they
inject only control flow faults, and then perform the simulation to see if their technique
can detect the injected fault or not. This targeted fault injection setup is perfect for
debugging to see if the technique is working in all the cases, but it is not the right
setup to estimate the effectiveness of the technique. This setup can measure, out of the
control flow faults injected, what fraction of the faults can be caught by their technique,
but control flow faults are only a small fraction of soft errors that happen.
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From the analysis of the results, we are able to find out why existing CFC tech-
niques are not very effective. Although it is true that many faults eventually translate
to control flow errors in programs, there are two ways in which this happens. i) Direct:
For example, a fault happens in the program counter, or PC. Then the control flow will
be altered. Most existing CFC techniques are able to capture such faults, but as our
analysis shows, only a small fraction of faults cause this. ii) Indirect: The fault, e.g., an
error in the register file does not cause a control flow error immediately, but eventually
this error propagates to variables that are used in deciding the branch outcome. While
most faults suffer this fate, no existing CFC technique can detect these faults. Notably
one of the latest techniques, CEDA makes a feeble attempt at this, but still falls far
short.
4
Chapter 2
BACKGROUND
Figure 2: Control Flow Error.
The intent of this research is to design, implement and validate a simulation
based framework to evaluate the effectiveness of control flow checking mechanisms,
specifically, the control flow error detection mechanisms. In order to evaluate the ef-
fectiveness, the domain of control flow checking needs to be explored to understand
the concepts involved and the models of error detection. As a first step, the variant of
soft errors which cause error in the control flow of applications, called the control flow
error, is defined. Given a program input, the series of instructions executed is fixed.
A control flow error (CFE) is defined as a deviation from the correct execution of the
program. The presence of soft errors increase the probability of the occurrence of a
control flow error. The Figure 2 shows a control flow graph of the program with basic
blocks as nodes and branches as edges. A basic block is a portion of the code in a
program with a single entry point and a single exit point or terminator instruction like
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branch or return instruction. In the Figure 2, the execution is legal from basic block
BB1 to BB2 or from BB1 to BB3, but it is illegal to jump from BB1 to BB4. If a soft
error strikes during the execution of instructions in BB1, and causes an illegal jump
to some address location in BB4, some of the instructions have been skipped. Such a
deviation in control flow is termed as a control flow error. A control flow error can
cause an erroneous program output, a system crash or a system hang, or may go silent
and cause output data errors, and hence the correct control flow is critical to the correct
execution of the program.
The second step is to derive a classification of CFEs. The various types of
errors are illustrated in Figure 3. For example, type A shows a control flow error that
can cause a change in legal direction of branch from taken direction (true condition for
conditional branch instructions) to the not-taken direction (the fall through or the false
condition for conditional branch instructions) or vice versa. The categories of CFEs
are further mapped to the corresponding sources of errors that can trigger each class of
CFEs. The correlation of these sources of control flow errors to the processor hardware
components will be established in the following sections, which helps to establish the
hardware-software interface at which the quantitative evaluation of soft errors is the
most relevant. In the table in Figure 3, the sources of the respective CFE models are
identified as follows (The classification of error models is taken from [34]):
• Error in Branch Condition– An error in the branch condition value computed
before the execution of the branch instruction will result in the execution of
incorrect legal branch (e.g., dotted arrow A in Figure 3).
• Error in Program Counter (PC)– An error in the PC, will result in an incorrect
instruction being fetched and executed; which results in haphazard segment of
the program being executed in random. Errors which skip instructions within a
6
Figure 3: Control Flow Errors and their Sources - For the control flow graph (over
program basic blocks) of a simple if-then-else kernel is shown, and the possible
control flow errors that can occur have been identified and labelled by dotted arrows.
The table explains each of the control flow error types, and the sources of these errors
in the system.
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basic block, or jump across basic blocks are examples of such errors (B, C & D
in Figure 3).
• Branch Insertion / Deletion– When the opcode of the instruction, during its ex-
ecution the processor pipeline, is affected by a soft error, a branch instruction
can be formed or deleted from the execution. This will result in a change in the
control flow of the program at the boundaries of the basic block transitions or will
result in skipping of instructions within a basic block or jumping across different
basic blocks (B, C & D in Figure 3).
• Error in Branch Offset– When the “branch offset” of the instruction is corrupted
by soft errors during execution, the target address of the branch is corrupted.
This will result in an illegal basic block, or random code, that crosses the program
memory bounds, being executed after a branch instruction (B, C & D in Figure 3).
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Chapter 3
MOTIVATION
The important question is why or why not CFC? There are several arguments in favour
of why control flow checking came into being in the first place and the several ben-
efits of control flow checking. 33% of all transient errors result in control flow error
on RISC processors [31]. It can be as high as 77% for CISC processors [37]. In gen-
eral, control flow checking techniques are known to be cost effective and/or provide
high coverage with less overheads, when compared to redundancy based mechanisms.
On an average, CFC techniques provide 90+% error coverage. The average additional
hardware cost for hardware based CFC mechanisms is less than 10%. For the software
based CFC techniques, the performance overhead is less than 100% which is compara-
tively less when compared to redundancy based techniques. For example, the errors de-
tected by a representative redundancy based technique, EDDI [30], is 22.08%, whereas
CFCSS, a typical control flow checking technique, can detect 35.26% of errors. Both
techniques achieve high error coverage (98.5% for EDDI, and 96.9% for CFCSS), al-
though a higher portion of it is contributed by correct results despite of fault injection,
and the faults detected by OS. The execution time overhead for EDDI is 105.9%, due
to duplication of instructions, compared to 43.14% for CFCSS. The impact of CFEs
on application software and operating systems was evaluated in [42] and is provided
here for reference, see Figure 4 and Figure 5. CFEs can cause programs to generate
wrong answers or outputs in 15% of the cases. The study on Linux OS as given in Fig-
ure 5 shows 55% of CFEs result in system crashes, while 9% result in kernel panics,
and a mere 3% in system hangs, causing a combined undesired system state in 67%
cases. Essentially, control flow checking can be considered as a low overhead soft error
protection scheme that has the potential to detect 33% to 77% soft errors.
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Figure 4: Effect of Control Flow Error on Application SW.
The above argument of why or why not CFC can be explained better if we can
evaluate the level of protection provided by CFC techniques against soft errors. So
that partly answers the next question - why evaluate CFC techniques? The response
to this question can clear the air on validity of claims of protection made by differ-
ent CFC techniques.The GemV-CFC toolset is used to evaluate purely hardware based,
purely software based and hybrid CFC techniques and the conclusion derived from the
results is that these techniques are ineffective in protecting the systems on which they
are implemented, and generally tend to increase the vulnerability of the system mak-
ing it more prone to transient errors. The quantitative evaluation of reliability before
and after applying CFC techniques can provide an idea about the level of protection
achieved by control flow checking techniques, whether it is positive or negative; neg-
ative as in reduction of reliability after applying the CFE detection technique due to
10
Figure 5: Effect of Control Flow Errors on Linux OS.
the additional instructions or overhead incurred in checking the correct control flow
which leaves the system more vulnerable. In order to evaluate the effectiveness and the
error coverage of existing CFC techniques, the level of protection acheived by these
techniques is compared with an unprotected program running on an unprotected sys-
tem. The introduction of the quantitative evaluation framework also makes possible
the comparison of reliability of different CFC techniques. On a closer look, the eval-
uation can identify loopholes in existing CFC techniques by measuring the protection
achieved for different processor hardware components which in turn gives an idea of
the extent to which a CFC technique protects a particular category of control flow errors
that are triggered by the hardware component. Thus, the component-wise evaluation
can identify the processor components which are heavily prone to soft errors even after
implementing the CFC scheme and can help the designer in exploring alternative cost-
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effective techniques to protect such components. The framework also provides avenues
to evaluate incremental modifications, and customizations of existing CFC techniques
for different processor architectures, as well as assessment of novel CFC techniques
against existing ones. It enables the designer to explore design tradeoffs between per-
formance and reliability of a processor architecture, on implementation of control flow
checking techniques, through simulations even before the RTL designs are available.
3.1 Mechanism of Control Flow based Protection
The philosophy behind control flow based techniques is that, when we analyze the data
flow graph of a program, most of the data computations eventually result in one or more
of the data involved in the execution of some control flow instruction (branch instruc-
tion). By verifying the execution of these control flow instructions, the computation
can ensure correct execution of all the instructions involved in the data flow that lead
to such control instructions. Chapter 4 discusses the error models and the sources of
control flow errors. In this work, we develop a means to translate the implementation of
a protection technique into its protection model for such control flow errors, and then
translate the protection achieved in the form of system vulnerability reduction. The
methods for deriving protection models are discussed in Chapter 6.
3.2 Need for Quantitative Evaluation
In the discussion of the control flow based error detection techniques provided in Chap-
ter 4, we observe that relative comparisons between implementations are presented in
the form of: (1) arguments for detection of increased control flow errors, thus resulting
in improved error coverage, (2) experimental results showing differences in perfor-
mance overhead between the implementations, (3) targeted fault injection experiments
on a simulation model, demonstrating the effectiveness of the proposed technique. The
inherent philosophy of control flow based error detection does not provide for a stan-
dard and unified method for evaluation of the proposed techniques. To the best of my
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knowledge, no quantitative methodology has been proposed to accurately analyze the
soft error protection achieved through the implementation of a control flow checking
technique, or to compare with another design. The failure rate derived from the fault in-
jection experiments, used here, though the closest measure of soft error rate, is plagued
by the following disadvantages:
1. The fault injection experiments are all targeted fault injections, directed to ana-
lyze the error detection capabilities of the specific technique implementation, and
are not representative of the error coverage provided to the processor as a whole.
Through detailed analysis, the GemV-CFC framework contradicts the portrayal
of the control flow based error detection techniques by targeted fault injection
campaigns as effective.
2. The experiments cannot be easily ported across different processor architectures
or configurations .
3. The targeted nature of the experiments used does not give an accurate measure
for comparative analysis among different proposed techniques.
4. Though fault injection experiments result in an estimate of SER (Soft Error Rate)
as a measure of system reliability, the significantly large number of simulation
runs required make this metric unusable for quick and extensive design space
explorations. The exhaustiveness of fault injection experiments required is shown
in an example provided in Section 8.1.
3.3 Reliability Metric: Vulnerabilty
During the execution of an application in a processor, program data is temporarily
stored on the numerous sequential elements in the processor (e.g., pipeline registers,
buffers, cache blocks, register file, etc.). The data stored (even temporarily) on these
elements is exposed to the effect of radiation induced transient errors and is therefore
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vulnerable to soft errors. Mukherjee et al[25] defined the term vulnerability for the
first time in this context and describe the same as the amount of time that sequential
elements store active program data used by the program for its execution. System
vulnerability is computed as the time period between component-accesses that expose
vulnerable data in the hardware, which then can be accumulated over all the active
components in the processor. In this work, the framework implements fine-grained bit-
level vulnerability models in each of the architecture components in the processor (with
the same implementation used for the cache in [38]); and compute system vulnerability
in bit-cycles. To ascertain confidence of the reliability evaluations obtained using
GemV-CFC, exhaustive fault injection experiments are performed on unit processor
components to validate the vulnerability implementation of the simulation setup.
Table 1: The vulnerability measurement tools currently available, and their drawbacks.
Although there are couple of vulnerability estimation tools available, there are
some drawbacks with these tools as shown in Table 1. The Asim simulator [9], equipped
with vulnerability definitions and vulnerability measurements from [25, 4], is a propri-
etary tool and measures only the vulnerability of a selected set of processor compo-
nents like Instruction Queue (IQ), L1 data cache, DTLB (Translation Lookaside Buffer
for L1 data cache), Store Queue (SQ) and execution units. Compared to ASIM, the
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Sim-SODA tool [11], based on Sim-Alpha simulator [7], models more processor com-
ponents like L1 data cache, DTLB, LQ (Load Queue), SQ, Victim Buffer, RF, ROB
(Reorder Buffer), FU (Functional Unit or Execution Unit), Instruction Window, and
Wake-up Table (Instruction Window and Wake-up Table together form the IQ). The re-
cently published SS-SERA tool [6], based on SimpleScalar simulator [3] models most
of the processor components except pipeline registers like L1 data cache, L1 instruction
cache, L2 unified cache, DTLB, ITLB, ROB, LSQ (Load Store Queue), IQ, FU, and RF
(Register File). To the best of my knowledge, the vulnerability modeling in these tools
is not validated. Moreover, none of these tools model the protection mechanisms of
control flow checking techniques. To overcome these drawbacks, a new vulnerability
estimation tool, GemV-CFC, based on the popular cycle-accurate simulator, gem5, is
developed and validated, and the modeling of protection mechanisms of control flow
checking techniques is integrated into the tool.
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Chapter 4
RELATED WORK
Figure 6: Classification of control flow based error detection techniques into purely
hardware, purely software and hardware-software (hybrid) solutions, alongwith their
detection coverage of error models.
With a vast variety of soft error detection and correction techniques, we need
a classification of the underlying techniques. The techniques can be categorized into
control flow checking techniques, redundancy based mechanisms, and a combination
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CFC
tech-
niques
Evaluation
methodology
Performance Overhead
Evaluation
Area/Power Over-
head Evaluation
Hardware based schemes
CFCET Analytical es-
timate
Time Stamp Counter Synthesis (only area)
ASIS Arguments NM Count additional bits
W-D-P Arguments
based on error
models
Memory overhead Count of gates and
extra bits
OSLC Fault injection NM NM
Hardware-software based (hybrid) schemes
SIS Fault injection Code size, memory over-
head
Count of gates and
bytes of memory
CSM Arguments
and equations
Analytical estimates Memory overhead
(average block size
and extra bits)
WA &
EPC
Equations NM NM
CFEDC Analytical
equations
based on error
models
Simulations, Memory over-
head
Synthesis (area and
power)
Software based schemes
CFCSS Targeted fault
injection
Actual execution time over-
head, Code size
N/A
ECCA Targeted fault
injection
NM (but available from
[44])
N/A
CEDA Targeted fault
injection
Simulations (Performance
and Memory overheads)
N/A
ACCE Targeted fault
injection
Actual execution time and
Memory overheads
N/A
YACCA Targeted fault
injection
Actual execution time and
Memory overheads
N/A
ACFC Targeted
fFault injec-
tion
Analytical estimates (num-
ber of extra instructions)
N/A
Table 2: Evaluation methodologies used for measuring error coverage, performance,
area and power overheads in various control flow checking based soft error protection
techniques.
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of both. Redundancy based techniques usually check the data flow by duplicating the
instructions in a program and comparing the results from the original and duplicate
stream of instructions. A classic example of redundancy based mechanisms is EDDI
by Oh et al [30]. On the other hand, control flow checking techniques, which are the
focus of this research, ensure the execution of correct sequence of instructions (which is
fixed given a program input), even in presence of soft errors. Control flow techniques
can be further classified into hardware based, software based, and hybrid which is a
combination of both. The software approaches come with desirable advantages over
hardware techniques, like cost effectiveness, reduction in design time, power savings,
reduction in chip area, and scalability to future systems, but at the cost of performance
overhead.
4.1 Hardware based Control Flow Checking techniques
Hardware control flow checking mechanisms generally rely on dedicated monitoring
hardware like watchdog processor or additional hardware within the processor core to
continuously monitor the control flow by comparing the runtime signatures with ref-
erence signatures, or instruction addresses with stored addresses, or by verifying the
integrity of signatures using error correction codes. TTA [23] decomposes the applica-
tion program into blocks and checks the execution time of blocks using timers in the
watchdog processor. During runtime, the start address and size of a block are monitored
to generate the block exit address, and a mismatch in the observed exit address and the
generated exit address indicates an error. CFCET uses execution tracing to transmit the
runtime branch instruction address and branch target address to an external watchdog
processor, which compares them with the reference addresses stored in its associative
memory. The coverage of the error models are shown in Figure 6, using the subscripted
letters from the classification given in Figure 3. ASIS [8] allows control flow checking
of several processors using a hardware signature generator, and a watchdog monitor.
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The watchdog receives the cumulative signature of instructions in a block and can de-
tect the start and end of the block whereas the monitor compares the signature using
a reference signature graph and detects mismatches. Similarly, W-D-P [22] verifies
the control flow using a reference control flow graph loaded in the watchdog proces-
sor. OSLC [20] also uses a similar mechanism but here the program is divided into
segments which are further divided into blocks. As shown in Table 2, most of the hard-
ware based techniques use analytical estimates (CFCET [33]) or functional arguments
(ASIS [8]) or arguments based on error models (W-D-P [22]) to justify their respective
error coverage, while OSLC [20] uses generic fault injection on address, control and
data lines to obtain its error coverage. Hardware techniques, in general, provide area
overhead information based on synthesis or simply by counting the additional hardware
bits and gates required to generate runtime signatures and monitor them. To provide an
idea of performance overhead, CFCET uses time stamp counters to measure execution
time, while W-D-P provides memory overhead involved. Here, NM in the table means
not measured.
4.2 Hybrid Control Flow Checking techniques
Hybrid control flow checking techniques generally involve code modifications using
the compiler, and modifications to the processor hardware, to assist in monitoring the
control flow. SIS [37] relies on signatured instruction streams for continuous monitor-
ing of signatures of the sequence of executed instructions using a watchdog processor.
Branch Address Hashing [36] (BAH) in SIS involves hashing of the branch instruc-
tion with its associated signature causing the branch address to be incorrect at compile
time, and its restoration to the original value at runtime. Two dimensional signature in
CSM [45] combines horizontal and vertical signatures where vertical signature is for
an interval of instructions that constitute multiple blocks, and horizontal signature adds
extra bits to each instruction word in the horizontal direction. Watchdog assist [35]
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transmits the checksum of executed instructions to the watchdog processor at the start
of each branch free execution block, where the watchdog starts subtracting the instruc-
tions and expects an all-zero result at the end of the block. CFEDC [10] modifies the
fetch and decode pipeline stages with a combinational circuit to correct any errors in
the control instruction preceded by a hamming code of the control instruction. SIS [37]
performs generic fault injection on address, data and control buses to collect its fault
coverage numbers. On the other hand, CSM [45] makes use of arguments based on
error models and probability based equations to extract its error coverage information.
Watchdog assists and extended precision checksums [35] use equations based on prob-
ability generating functions to estimate the error coverage, while CFEDC [10] uses
simple analytical equations based on error models. CFEDC provides area and power
overheads using RTL synthesis, whereas SIS counts the additional gates required in its
hadrware portion of control flow checking and the extra bytes of memory added to the
assembler and loader code. CSM provides the memory overhead using average block
size information and the extra bits added to the instructions. To provide performance
overhead, SIS resorts to code size and memory overheads, while CSM generates ana-
lytical estimates of performance loss using average block sizes and weighted-average
performance overhead per control-flow construct, and CFEDC performs simulations
using modelsim to obtain the execution times, and extracts the memory overhead in-
curred.
4.3 Software based Control Flow Checking techniques
Software tecnhiques are characterized by program modification by compilers or binary
translators to insert software signatures that represent the control flow of the program,
and verification of the runtime generated signatures by comparing them with the pre-
assigned sinatures. CFCSS inserts a signature comparison at the start of each basic
block after transforming the previous block’s signature to that of the current block.
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ECCA [2] fortifies the blocks with assertions and raises a divide by zero exception
using a set of equations based on the block identifier and the product of permissible
block IDs from the current block. CEDA [42] differs from CFCSS in the careful as-
signment of signatures to avoid the classic aliasing problem between legal and illegal
branches when multiple nodes share multiple branch fan-in nodes as their destination
nodes. ACCE [43] builds on the CEDA infrastucture by providing the correction ca-
pability. Local and global function error handlers detect illegal jumps from the current
function and restore the control flow to the function where the error occured, respec-
tively. YACCA [13] claims to cover even the errors not crossing the block boundaries,
and avoids the branches in control flow checking code. Moreover, like CEDA, it re-
peats the condition checking of a conditional branch at the start of the target nodes for
both true and false clauses. ACFC [44] reduces the execution overhead by combin-
ing the instrumentation of multiple basic blocks using one instruction and assigning a
parity bit per basic block. The software techniques (CFCSS, ECCA [2], CEDA [42],
ACCE [43], YACCA [13], and ACFC [44]), in general, perform targeted fault injection
experiments to gather their fault coverage numbers. Also, most techniques provide per-
formance overhead data using actual executions or simulations of benchmarks. Only
ACFC provides its performance overhead using analytical estimates based on number
of extra instructions. Since there is no additional hardware involved, these techniques
don’t provide area or power overheads.
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Chapter 5
CONTRIBUTIONS
Figure 7: The requirements of a better vulnerability evaluation framework.
The major contributions from this work are:
1. The work develops and validates a comprehensive simulation based reliability
estimation tool−GemV-CFC. The vulnerability measurements are based on the
vulnerability and Architecural Vulnerability Factor (AVF) definitions from [25].
The fact that the tool is thoroughly validated, as detailed in Section 8.1, adds
to the robustness of the framework. The core requirements of a vulnerability
estimation tool for control flow checking, as shown in Figure 7, are satisfied by
the GemV-CFC tool.
2. We develop a systematic methodology to model the protection mechanism of
control flow checking tehcniques. The systematic approach is quite generic and
can be applied to any control flow checking scheme.
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Chapter 6
THE SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO DERIVE PROTECTION MODEL FOR CFC
The systematic approach to derive the protection model for a control flow checking
mechanism tries to answer the following questions:
1. What is a CFC technique trying to protect?
2. How is the CFC scheme achieving the protection?
In order to answer what CFC is trying to protect, we need a deifnition for a control flow
error. A control flow error causes a deviation from an expected sequence of execution,
given a program input.
1. This translates to an expected program counter (PC) transition from PC = i at
cycle t to NPC = j at cycle t+1, where NPC implies the next instruction’s PC.
2. Instead, due to a soft error, an erroneous NPC = k is loaded at cycle t+1.
Figure 8: The error in various processor components can lead to an erroneous PC
transition.
There are various components in the processor, as shown in Figure 8, which
are exposed to bit flips and can possibly cause erroneous PC transitions. The obvious
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question that arises is how can a bit flip cause an erroneous value to be loaded in PC. In
order to provide a solution to the above questions, a systematic flow of steps to derive
the protection model of CFC schemes is explained. The decision points in the flow will
provide the required solutions.
Figure 9: The systematic methodology to derive the protection model of control flow
checking mechanisms.
As shown in Figure 9, we consider how a bit flip can translate to a erroneous PC
to NPC transition and given such a transition, whether it can be detected by the CFC
mechanism or not. The flow of the systematic methodology proceeds as follows:
1. A bit flip happens in a processor component in cycle t.
2. The bit flip translates to multiple erroneous PC to NPC transitions in later cycles.
Let the cardinality of the set of such erroneous pairs of PC and NPC be n.
3. For each incorrect PC to NPC transition, given the value of the PC and the incor-
rect next PC, determine whether the control flow checking technique can detect
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the error or not. If the CFC can detect the error, the PC to NPC transition is
considered to be part of the safe zone. On the other hand, if it cannot be detected,
it is considered to be in the vulnerable zone.
4. If at least one pair of PC and NPC is in the vulnerable zone, the bit is considered
vulnerable in cycle t. If all the incorrect PC to NPC transitions due to a bit flip
fall under the safe zone, the bit essentially cannot cause a control flow error and
can be deemed not vulnerable in cycle t.
The flow poses two questions which require further analysis:
1. How to identify whether a bit flip can translate to erroneous PC to NPC transi-
tions, and what are the corresponding PC to modified NPC values?
2. Given the values of PC and NPC in an incorrect PC to NPC transition, how does
the CFC determine whether it is in the safe zone or vulnerable zone?
6.1 Identification of Safe Zone and Vulnerable Zone
To identify if an incorrect pair of PC and NPC can be detected, the CFC scheme has
to spell out the categories of control flow errors that it can detect. For example, let
us conisder the software based CFC scheme, CFCSS. As shown in Figure 10, RSR
or Runtime Signature Register holds the identifying signature of a basic block during
runtime. At the start of the basic block BB3, the signature of the predecessor basic
block BB2 is expected in RSR. The control flow checking code at the beginning of the
basic block transforms this expected value in RSR to match the signature of BB3 using
XOR operation. It compares the RSR with the signature value of BB3 and a mismatch
will flag an error. Now, if an incorrect jump takes place from BB3 to BB2, the RSR will
be holding the signature of BB3 while executing instructions in BB2. When it jumps
to BB3 at the end of BB2, RSR holds an incorrect signature value of BB3, instead of
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Figure 10: CFCSS can detect an incorrect jump from a basic block to a different basic
block, but not to the same basic block.
the expected signature of BB2. The transformation will place an incorrect signature
in RSR for comparison, triggering a call to flag the error. Therefore, an incorrect PC
to NPC transition to a different basic block can be detected by CFCSS. On the other
hand, if an incorrect branch happens within the basic block BB2, the RSR will still hold
the signature of BB2 while executing BB2, and the transformation in BB3 will execute
smoothly without flagging an error. This implies an erroneous PC to NPC transition to
the same basic block cannot be detected by CFCSS.
After a thorough analysis of CFCSS, we generated a table which maps different
categories of PC to NPC transitions to safe zone (SZ) or vulnerable zone (VZ), as
shown in Table 3. Here, in Table 3 (b), corresponding PC and NPC categories from
Table 3 (a) are marked as 1 and rest all categories are marked as 0. For example, for the
first entry in Table 3 (a), since a PC to NPC transition from a basic block comprising
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Table 3: The CFCSS mapping of PC to NPC categories to safe or vulnerable zones.
original source code (excluding the additional control flow checking code) to the same
original source code basic block cannot be detected by CFCSS, it falls under vulnerable
zone. For the corresponding entry in Table 3 (b), the original source code sub-category
(marked as O) for PC is shown as 1, and the same basic block original source code sub-
category (marked as OS) is shown as 1 for NPC. Rest all sub-categories in the table
entry are marked as 0. A 1 in the last column indicates vulnerable zone, whereas a 0
implies safe zone.
Given the mapping table and the set of incorrect PC to NPC values due to a bit
flip in some processor component, the flow in Figure 11 can be used to identify the
decision of a CFC scheme to place a PC to NPC transition in the safe or the vulner-
able zone. First, it determines the category of a given PC to NPC transition. For the
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Figure 11: Control flow checking technique places an incorrect PC to NPC transition in
safe or vulnerable zone based on its mapping table of PC to NPC transition categories to
safe/vulnerable zones. For example, the mapping table for CFCSS is given in Table 3.
previous example of CFCSS (shown in Figure 10), given the PC and NPC values and
the boundaries of basic blocks, we can determine whether the PC falls in a basic block
comprising original source code or control flow checking code. We can also determine
if the NPC falls in the same basic block of original source code or a different basic
block, given the basic block boundaries. Once the category of PC to NPC transition is
known, the mapping table in Table 3 can be used to determine whether the transition
falls under the safe zone or vulnerable zone. For example, for the incorrect jump from
a basic block of original source code (BB3) to a different basic block of original source
code (BB2), shown in Figure 10, the second entry in Table 3 maps to safe zone. On the
other hand, the incorrect jump from a basic block to the same basic block of original
source code (BB2) is mapped to vulnerable zone in the first entry in the table. Simi-
larly, the mapping tables for other CFC techniques like CFCSS+NA, CEDA, CFEDC
and CFCET are shown in Table 4 a-d.
6.2 Determining the Set of Incorrect PC to NPC Values
To determine the incorrect PC to NPC values due to a bit flip in a processor component,
we assume an inorder processor with no branch prediciton, an ECC protected L1 data
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Table 4: The mapping of PC to NPC categories to safe or vulnerable zones for different
CFC schemes.
cache and a parity protected L1 instruction cache, as shown in Figure 12. The assump-
tion simplifies the discussion, although the approach is not restrictive and can be easily
extended to out-of-order processors with advanced branch prediction mechanisms.
Let us consider the vulnerability of PC bits. A bit flip in PC can cause an
erroneous NPC value to be written into the PC if the MUX select bit in Figure 12
indicates a non-branch instruction. Let us assume a non-branch instruciton in the
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Figure 12: A simplistic 5-stage inorder pipeline.
current cycle. A bit flip in the PC causes a 1-bit hamming distance value to be held in
the PC. The corresponding PC and NPC values in such an erroneous transition will be
as follows:
PC =Current PC (6.1)
NPC = (1-bit hamming distance Current PC)+4 (6.2)
Inorder to derive the vulnerability of PC for the current cycle, the next PC values for
every 1-bit hamming distance values of current PC are calculated and these PC to NPC
values are provided as inputs to the safe/vulnerable zone determination using the map-
ping table for the CFC mechanism under consideration. If the MUX select bit indicates
a branch instruction, the erroneous PC values are overwritten in the next cycle with
values from the branch target address field in the execute-memory pipeline register.
In that case, since the erroneous PC value is not used to fetch instructions, the PC bits
can be considered not vulnerable for the current cycle.
Now let us consider the vulnerability of the branch target address field in the
execute-memory (EX/MEM) pipeline register. If the MUX select bit, which is derived
from the branch/non-branch control bit in the execute-memory pipeline register, in-
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dicates a branch instruction in the current cycle, a bit flip in the branch target address
field can cause an erroneous value to be written in the next cycle. For this incorrect PC
to NPC transition, the corresponding PC and NPC values are given as:
PC =Current PC (6.3)
NPC = 1-bit hamming distance EX/MEM Branch Target Address (6.4)
Applying similar logic to that of PC, the bits in branch target address field in the
pipeline register are deemed vulnerable or non-vulnerable based on the safe/vulnerable
zone determination of the corresponding PC to NPC values for every 1-bit hamming
distance value. The bits can be considered non-vulnerable if the MUX select bit indi-
cates a non-branch instruction for the current cycle.
To measure the vulnerability of the branch/non-branch control bit in the
EX/MEM pipeline register, we consider two cases:
1. The bit indicates a branch instruction and is flipped to indicate a non-branch
instruction in the current cycle.
2. The bit shows a non-branch instruction and is flipped to indicate a branch in-
struciton in the current cycle.
In the first case, the erroneous PC value is supplied to the adder from the PC itself to
increment by 4, as the MUX select bit indicates the instruction in the current cycle to
be non-branch, instead of taking the value from the branch target address field in the
EX/MEM pipeline register for a normal branch instruction. The corresponding PC and
NPC values are:
PC =Current PC (6.5)
NPC =Current PC+4 (6.6)
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On the other hand, in the second case, the erroneous PC value is read from the branch
target address field in the EX/MEM pipeline register, as the MUX seelct bit indicates
the instruction in the current cycle to be a branch instruction, instead of supplying the
value of PC to the adder to increment by 4 for the actual non-branch instruction. The
corresponding PC and NPC values are:
PC =Current PC (6.7)
NPC = EX/MEM Branch Target Address (6.8)
Now let us move to the fields in the decode-execute (ID/EX) pipeline register. For the
branch offset field in the ID/EX pipeline register, a bit flip can cause an erroneous
value to be used in the execution to calculate branch target address for the next cycle,
provided the branch/non-branch control bit in the ID/EX pipeline register shows a
branch instruction in the current cycle. The PC and NPC values for the corresponding
incorrect PC to NPC transition can be derived as:
PC = PC f ield in ID/EX pipeline register (6.9)
NPC = (1-bit hamming distance ID/EX Branch O f f set)shi f t le f t by 2 (6.10)
+(PC f ield in ID/EX pipeline register)
For the PC field in the ID/EX pipeline register, the same equations can be used except
that the 1-bit hamming distance is applied in that pipeline PC field. For the PC and
branch offset fields in the fetch-decode (IF/ID) pipeline register, the same equations
apply. For the opcode field in the IF/ID pipeline register, the same logic applies for
PC to NPC calculation as the branch/non-branch control bit in the ID/EX pipeline
register, except that the PC to NPC values for every 1-bit hamming distance opcode that
can transform a branch instruction to non-branch instruction (and vice-versa) have to be
considered. This completes the vulnerability calculations of PC and pipeline registers
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in an inorder pipeline as the instruction field in the IF/ID is fetched from L1 instruction
cache which is considered protected using parity.
6.3 Direct and Indirect Sources of Control Flow Errors
Until now, we considered control flow errors caused due to bit flips in processor com-
ponents like PC and pipeline registers. The errors in these processor components are
read only once and have direct impact on the NPC value, mostly in the next cycle or a
subsequent cycle. The values in these registers will be overwritten every cycle during
normal execution. Such processor components are classified as direct CFE sources. On
the contrary, bit flips in the processor components like register file (RF), and pipeline
buffers like instruction queue (IQ), load store queue (LSQ), branch target buffer (BTB),
and register rename table, can be retained for multiple cycles and can be read multiple
times. And these erroneous values can be passed on to other processor components
before reflecting in a control flow error. Therefore, the bit flips in these components
can cause multiple erroneous PC to NPC transitions in later cycles. These processor
components are classified as indirect CFE sources. For the ARM architecture, under
consideration, there are two cases that can cause such indirect control flow errors.
Figure 13: The register move to PC from link register causing an indirect control flow
error.
The first case is an instruction involving a register move from one of the 16
architectural registers in ARM to the ARM PC register (register 15). For example,
most of the compilers use the ARM mov pc, lr instruction to accomplish this where lr
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denotes the link register. This instruction is used to restore the return address at the end
of a function. The sequence of instructions associated with this register move to PC
are shown in Figure 13. In the function call, the link register is loaded with the PC of
the next instruction.The first instruction in the function body will push the link register
onto the stack. Now the link register value is safe in ECC protected memory. Just
before the register move to PC to restore the return address, the link register is popped
from the stack. Note that the link register holds the vulnerable value that can corrupt
PC, but the vulnerability interval for this link register usage is quite short. It involves a
one cycle interval at the function call and another 1-cycle interval before restoring the
return address. Although this is a minor portion of the link register usage, we give the
benefit of the doubt to the control flow checking schemes and assume them to protect
the link register completely.
Figure 14: The jump check instructions in CEDA to provide protection against error in
branch condition.
The second case involves a bit flip in a indirect source like a register in the RF
causing an error somewhere in the data flow leading to the branch condition. Usually
the branch direction in a conditional branch instruction is determined by a comparison
which involves two registers or a register and an immediate value. These registers being
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Figure 15: The jump check instructions in CEDA cannot be inserted if the legal branch
target basic blocks have multiple basic blocks as their predecessors, which may not use
the same branch comparison variables.
Figure 16: The jump check instructions in CEDA can only protect error in condition
flag after the execution of comparison instruction and before the execution of condi-
tional branch instruction.
compared may have derived their values from arithmetic, register move or memory
load instructions executed before the comparison operation. The source registers used
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in the arithmetic or register move operations have derived their values from arithmetic,
register move or memory load instructions executed earlier, and this continues as a
data flow chain. A bit flip in any processor component used in this data flow chain
like the registers in the RF or the entries in the pipeline buffers can cause an error in
the data values, leading to the branch condition to be erroneous. Therefore, instead
of taking the expetced “true” direction of the conditional branch for the given input,
it may be forced to fall through in the “false” direction or vice versa. To the best of
my knowledge, there are only two control flow checking schemes that try to provide
protection against control flow errors due to errors in branch condition - CEDA and
YACCA. They use jump check conditions as shown in Figure 14. It shows a branch
being taken from basic block B1 to B2 if the variable foo > 0 or the branch falls through
from B1 to B3 if the condition is false. At the start of B2 and B3, the condition is
checked again and if it deviates from the expected values, an error is flagged. The
jump check is possible only if the branch target basic blocks have the basic block with
the corresponding conditional branch as its only predecessor. If they have multiple
predecessors as shown in Figure 15, as is mostly the case, the jump check will fail even
in an error-free execution as these predecessor blocks may not generally use the foo
variable. Even in the cases where jump check instructions can be inserted, it protects
only the condition flag bits in the processor status register after the comparison and
before the conditional branch is executed, as shown in Figure 16. Again, this represents
a minor portion of the vulnerable period of the processor status register, and to give the
benefit of the doubt to the CFC schemes employing the jump check instructions (like
CEDA), the processor status register is considered not vulnerable.
6.4 Coverage of Control Flow Error Models
Based on the application of the systematic methodology on the CFC techniques used as
case studies, Table 5 identifies the control flow errors that are covered (marked as D) by
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Detected Control Flow Errors
Protection PC Branch Branch Branch Branch
Technique Condition Insert Delete Offset
CFCSS D - D - D
CFCSS+NA D - D - D
CEDA D D D D D
CFEDC D - D D D
CFCET - - D - D
Table 5: Coverage of error models for the Case Study experiments.
these protection techniques. Here, we can observe that only a subset of the control flow
errors are covered by each. From our analysis of protection models, we can observe
that soft errors in only a few processor hardware components are actually detected by
the control flow protection techniques proposed - PC, pipeline registers, link register
and processor status register.
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Chapter 7
THE GEMV-CFC FRAMEWORK
Figure 17: The approach in a flowchart.
The implementation framework for quantitative evaluation of control flow check-
ing techniques is called GemV-CFC to emphasize the usage of the modular, discrete
event driven and cycle-accurate computer system simulator, gem5, to track the vul-
nerability of processor components when programs are hardened using control flow
checking mechanisms. The V in GemV stands for vulnerability. The working of this
framework is described in the following steps and the flow is shown in Figure 17:
1. Given an application program as the input, instrument the compiler to extract in-
formation on the control flow checking technique to assist the simulator in track-
ing vulnerability of processor components protected by the CFC mechanism. The
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purely software based and software portion of the hybrid CFC mechanisms are
generally implemented in the compiler.
2. Derive the component specific protection models as applicable to the CFC tech-
nique in the cycle accurate microarchitectural simulator, gem5. Note that the
purely hardware based and hardware portion of the hybrid CFC techniques are
implemented in the gem5 simulator.
3. Along with the protection models for control flow checking mechanisms, imple-
ment vulnerability tracking functionality in gem5 simulator to form the GemV-
CFC framework, and simulate the input application using the GemV-CFC.
4. Collate the vulnerability statistics provided by the GemV-CFC.
Figure 18: The overview diagram of the infrastructure.
The overall framework as shown in Figure 18 illustrates the flow of the input
program through different components of the framework. The input application source
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code is fed to the compiler. LLVM compiler framework[19] is used to instrument the
CFC techniques and to gather information required to aid vulnerability tracking of the
processor components in the GemV-CFC simulator to derive the protected component
of vulnerability. For example, the control flow checking instructions can be marked, or
the boundaries of basic blocks and control flow checking instructions can be marked
in order to assist vulnerability tracking as per the protection model of the CFC used
in the simulator. The significance of such inputs from LLVM compiler to GemV-CFC
simulator, along with other components in the overview diagram will be explained in
detail shortly in the next few sections as we go through the simulator framework and
the case study of different control flow checking mechanisms where the GemV-CFC
toolset is applied to analyse the protection achieved.
As part of the GemV-CFC framework, a protection model or PM is derived for
the control flow checking for each hardware component intended to be protected by
the CFC mechanism, as explained in Chapter 6. The protection model encapsulates
the level of protection achieved by the control flow checking method when applied to a
processor component. A control flow error in a processor component can be protected
by the control flow technique to some extent or can be protected completely. The extent
to which the processor component is protected can involve coverage for only some of
the sub-components or some bits in the register or the sequential storage element being
considered.
The vulnerability tracker module or VT in the GemV-CFC framework provides
the capability and interfaces to track vulnerability of the processor components. The
VT design is quite generic and scalable, and is customizable for each processor compo-
nent as the functionality entails. It can calculate the total vulnerability and the protected
vulnerability of the corresponding processor component. The effective vulnerability of
an architectural component upon implementing the CFC technique is derived by de-
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Figure 19: The GemV-CFC framework.
ducting the protected vulnerability from the total vulnerability of the component. The
effective vulnerability of all components are accumulated to obtain the effective vulner-
ability of the system. All that is required in the simulation code is to attach an instance
of VT to each processor component as shown in Figure 19, with the component spe-
cific customizations applicable, if any. The vulnerability tracker consists of two main
components.
1. Access Tracker.
2. Vulnerability Interval Tracker.
The access tracker tracks the accesses to the attached processor component. For exam-
ple, when the VT is attached to a register in the register file (RF), the access tracker
in the VT tracks the reads and writes to the register. The vulnerability interval tracker
tracks the vulnerability intervals or the durations when the processor components are
exposed to control flow errors. For example, the vulnerable and non-vulnerable inter-
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vals for the read-write access pattern to a register in the register file are demonstrated
in Figure 20. The first write (leftmost) to read is vulnerable whereas the first read to
write to is non-vulnerable as the register data gets overwritten. Accordingly, the second
write to the last read (rightmost) is also vulnerable.
Figure 20: The vulnerability tracking for a register in the register file.
The vulnerability tracker has three interfaces to selectively track the relevant
accesses. The register access interface registers the access time (tick in simulation
jargon), the access mode (read or write), and the number of bits accessed for each access
to the processor component, and associates these access details to an access entry with
an access ID for tracking purposes. For out of order processors, the instructions in
flight or dynamic instructions may be committed for the usual sequence of executed
instructions or discarded (squashed), for example, in case of a branch misprediction.
The commit access interface commits the component access entries that are part of the
committed dynamic instructions whereas the remove access interface deletes the access
entries that are part of the squashed dynamic instructions.
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Chapter 8
EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
8.1 GemV-CFC Validation
Inorder to verify the correctness of GemV-CFC implementation, a correlation between
the vulnerability metric used in GemV-CFC and soft error rate (SER) measured by
fault injection campaigns is established. As defined in section(Section 3.3), the term
vulnerability represents the time period between accesses that expose vulnerable data
in the hardware component. The vulnerability of all bits in a hardware component are
accumulated for all active bit-cycles and further the accumulation is extended to all
active components in the processor. Fault injection campaigns inject the fault in spe-
cific bits at specific locations in hardware on predetermined clock cycles and count the
number of simulations which generate erroneous output and calculate SER as the ratio
of erroneous simulations to the total number of simulations. Comprehensive fault injec-
tion in a microarchitectural simulator, although prohibitively time consuming, provides
coverage for almost all soft errors that can occur at the microarchitectural level. Vulner-
abiliy overestimates the effect of a certain set of soft errors masked by a phenomenon
called software masking or data-value masking by counting the corresponding bits as
vulnerable, whereas fault injection may take into account the masking effect. For ex-
ample, an AND instruction with an operand 0 will mask the possible errors in the other
operand. Since the GemV-CFC implementation is based on the vulnerability metric,
the input program for validation has to be devoid of data values that can cause software
masking. Otherwise, the injected fault will be masked and will not manifest as an error
in the program output, whereas the bit-cycle will still be counted as vulnerable by the
vulnerability evaluation framework.
To provide a glimpse of the practicality of fault injection experiments, a MiBench
benchmark takes 39 billion cycles on an average to execute on gem5 simulator, and it
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takes 1121 seconds to simulate the benchmark on the host processor. The host proces-
sor considered here is a compute node on our 22-node linux cluster (21 Dual Quad-
Core Intel Xeon E5620 2.4GHz processors with 24GB RAM, 1 NVIDIA Fermi M2050
GPU with 1.5GB RAM). In the case of a 32-bit register, the total number of fault injec-
tion simulations required are Number of bits in the register × average execution cycles
= 1.25 trillion. So, the total host simulation time required for the fault injection cam-
paign on the 32-bit register is 1400 trillion seconds and it takes 252 years to complete
on the 22-node cluster.
A component specific validation infrastructure based on fault injection is de-
signed and implemented in gem5 framework. Architecture components like PC and
entries from the integer register file (RF) are selected inorder to provide a reasonable
coverage of the processor. Since it is practically infeasible to conduct fault injection
campaigns on larger benchmarks, a few small programs like matrix multiplication, dot
product of vectors, vector addition, and matrix determinant are selected for ease of
analysis and all input values are forced to be non-zero to avoid software masking. Ini-
tially, the input program is simulated without injecting any faults and the error-free
output is saved for reference. The execution time of the error-free simulation is also
noted. An error is injected in a selected bit position in one of the representative 32-bit
temporary integer registers in ARM architecture on a selected simulation cycle during
the execution of the input binary. If the simulation completes successfully, the resulting
output is compared with the reference output. A mismatch is counted as a vulnerable
bit-cycle. If the output is an exact copy of the reference output, the bit is deemed not
vulnerable for the specific cycle. If the injected fault results in a segmentation fault, or
similar architectural exceptions, the simulation run is tallied under the vulnerable bit-
cycle bucket. An infinite loop is detected if the execution time exceeds the reference
execution time plus an additional fixed buffer time, and the corresponding simulation
45
is enumerated as a vulnerable bit-cycle. Both vulnerable and non-vulnerable bit-cycles
are counted towards the total simulation bit-cycles. The experiment is repeated for ev-
ery bit in the register for every simulation cycle. The ratio of the vulnerable bit-cycles
to the total simulation bit-cycles gives the component SER for the paritcular register in
the register file. Similar experiments are carried out for PC, and four registers in the
integer RF. Further, the component level soft error rates are compared with the total
vulnerability values derived from the GemV-CFC framework. As shown in Table 6,
the results show almost 100% correlation between the vulnerability values of architec-
ture components from the GemV-CFC implementation and the soft error rates obtained
from fault injection based validation experiments. The vulnerability calculation of most
other processor components are modelled on similar lines and should show the same
trend.
Table 6: GemV-CFC fault injection validation results.
As the current vulnerability estimation tools don’t model the vulnerability of
pipeline registers accurately, we obtain the number of vulnerable bits per instruciton per
pipeline stage from an open source ARM AMBER processor RTL design [1]. These
pipeline register vulnerability numbers are validated in RTL using fault injection.
8.2 Case Study: Application of GemV-CFC in analysis of CFC Techniques
To demonstrate the applications of GemV-CFC, experiments are performed to evalu-
ate the protection achieved on embedded systems for four state-of-the-art control flow
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Compilation Environment
Compiler LLVM (ARM v7-a)
Cross-compiler CodeBench gcc (ARM v7-a)
Simulation Environment
Mode System Emulation mode
Architecture ARM v7-a
Pipeline 5-stages (Out-Of-Order)
L1 D-Cache 64KB (2-way)
L1 I-Cache 32KB (2-way)
D-TLB / I-TLB 64 entries
Table 7: Experimental setup for the case study demonstration of the GemV-CFC frame-
work.
based techniques proposed recently, on 14 benchmarks from the MiBench suite [14].
The setup of the experiments is shown in Table 7. The L1 instruction cache and data
cache are assumed to have parity protection and ECC protection, respectively. For
the benchmark programs used in the experiments, the additional control flow checking
instructions for the software and hybrid techniques are inserted during the late code
generation phase of the LLVM compiler. In addition, the generated code is annotated
(see Figure 18) with the information required by the GemV-CFC simulator for accurate
vulnerability and protection analysis on the system. Similarly, hardware changes to
the processor required by the hardware and hybrid techniques are implemented in the
GemV-CFC simulator. In addition, the vulnerability tracker and protection models for
the hardware changes are updated wherever required. The systematic methodology to
derive the protection models are discussed in Chapter 6. This section briefly describes
the mechanism of the implemented technique, and discuss the evaluation results derived
from the GemV-CFC framework.
8.3 Control Flow Protection by Software Signatures (CFCSS)
Control Flow Checking by Software Signatures (CFCSS) [29] is a software only con-
trol flow protection (CFP) technique. Figure 21 describes the mechanism of the pro-
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Figure 21: Working of control flow error detection through software signatures. The
original program with four basic blocks (B1∼B4) is shown with the CFCSS imple-
mentation of signature-checking code (S1∼S4) to detect control flow errors during its
execution.
posed method by means of a simplified example. For a given program when imple-
mented with the CFCSS compiler technique, signature-checking code is inserted at the
beginning of each of the basic-blocks in the program. The idea here is that, by means of
software signatures, the basic blocks of the program are marked. During compilation,
the legal successors to a basic block are identified, and the signature-checking code is
installed to verify the transitions during execution. The checker code is composed of
xor logic over the signature values. For example, in Figure 21, such a legal transition is
verified by the S2 header in the basic block B2. In the case of a soft error that triggers a
control flow error, any other basic block of the program could be executed. In this case,
the signature-checking code of that basic block (say for example S4 of basic block B4
in Figure 21), check the signature values, and identifies that this block was executed
from an illegal predecessor. Therefore, a control flow error is detected in the system.
The working of control flow error detection through software signatures hinges
on the fact that each of the basic blocks in a program are assigned unique 32-bit sig-
natures. In the case when a block has two predecessors, the CFCSS mechanism is
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Figure 22: Demonstrating the aliasing problem in CFCSS implementation, with an
example CFG.
such that either of the predecessors is chosen at random as the base, and the signature-
checking code is designed to verify transitions from either of the legal predecessors
using xor logic operations on the signatures. In the case when multiple blocks share
multiple successor nodes with the successor nodes having multiple predecessor nodes,
owing to the mechanism of signature assignment and verification in CFCSS, aliasing of
the signatures renders certain control flow errors undetectable. Figure 22(a) describes
the aliasing problem with an example. In the example B4 and B5 share B2 as a common
predecessor, and therefore instead of a random selection of predecessors for signature
verification, CFCSS restricts the base for runtime adjusting signature calculations to the
common predecessor B2, and the signature-checking code is generated [29]. In the case
of a control flow error that causes B5 to execute after B1, the aliasing problem renders
such errors undetectable. Chao et al [5] in their work develop a method to overcome
this aliasing problem, which is described in Figure 22. In this, between blocks that
form a “W” structure (introducing the aliasing problem), one of the transition edges is
interrupted by a dummy block with a unique signature of its own. This method ensures
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that no two basic blocks in the program share a common predecessor, thus improving
on soft error coverage.
Figure 23: The implementation of CFCSS in LLVM.
The implementation of CFCSS in the popular LLVM compiler [19] consists
of the generation of a global control flow graph, applying the CFCSS algorithm to
the input program using the graph, and extracting the information on the technique to
provide inputs to GemV-CFC, as shown in Figure 23. A global control flow graph
(GCFG) incorporates the complete control flow transitions in the program. The nodes
in the graph are basic blocks in the program, and the edges in the graph are the con-
trol flow transitions in the program, as defined in the previous section. The control
flow transitions include branches, subroutine calls, and return statements. In effect,
the GCFG incorporates the intra-function Control Flow Graph (CFG), which is readily
available in LLVM, along with the inter-function CFG, which adds subroutine calls as
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transition edges to the graph. The call and return statements are parsed to identify the
predecessor, and successor nodes in the inter-function CFG. The GCFG is generated at
the machine code level after the code generation step in the LLVM compiler backend.
The GCFG generation and CFCSS algorithm blocks are implemented as passes in the
LLVM compiler. The CFCSS implementation in the compiler provides the flexibility to
choose two processor architectures, ARM and MIPS. The program is fed to the CFCSS
pass which applies the CFCSS algorithm by adding the CFCSS header instructions to
the basic blocks. The LLVM CFCSS instrumentation module tags the CFCSS header
boundaries and the original basic block boundaries using comments in the assembly
file generated during compilation.
The assembly file is cross compiled using the gcc cross compiler for ARM to
generate the program binary. The object dump from the binary along with the assembly
file are parsed to correlate the assembly comment tags for block boundaries to the
instruction addresses in the object dump file. This correlation information serves as the
link between LLVM and GemV-CFC.
8.3.1 Experimental Evaluation
Over the years, researchers have motivated for, and also demonstrated the effectiveness
of the proposed control flow protection techniques, for commodity processors with the
help of targeted fault injection experiments and relative comparisons. Through accurate
and systematic modeling of system vulnerability and the protection achieved through
the implementation of such protection techniques, GemV-CFC is able to analyze for the
first time the effectiveness of the techniques in embedded systems. Figure 24 and Fig-
ure 25 present the results obtained from the experiments with the GemV-CFC frame-
work upon implementation of the software based control flow protection techniques,
CFCSS [29] and CFCSS+NA [5], respectively. The graphs show the effective system
vulnerability (with protection) normalized over that of the original program.
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Figure 24: The effective system vulnerability (normalized over original program vul-
nerability) with CFCSS.
8.3.1.1 CFCSS Ineffective for Processor
1. When CFCSS is implemented on embedded processors, control flow protection
only tends to increase system vulnerability after protection for all but one bench-
mark. In the case of an improved technique CFCSS+NA, we can observe that the
vulnerability increases for all the benchmarks.
2. On an average, CFCSS and CFCSS+NA increase system vulnerability by 18%.
The reason behind this behavior can be attributed to the fact that CFCSS incurs
(on average) 22% performance penalty for software protection, by means of 48%
increased number of instructions executed, thus increasing the residency of exe-
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Figure 25: The effective system vulnerability (normalized over original program vul-
nerability) with CFCSS+NA (CFCSS with no aliasing).
cution data in vulnerable blocks. CFCSS+NA incurs a performance overhead of
21% and executes an additional 49% instructions to verify the control flow.
3. One startling fact to note here is that, the control flow protection technique imple-
mented to protect the execution of branch instructions requires 84% additional
branch executions.
We further looked into the contribution of the control flow checking code to-
wards the effective system vulnerability and the execution time, as shown in Figure 26.
On an average. the control flow checking code contributes 32.5% of the effective sys-
tem vulnerability, and 19.5%o f theexecutiontime.
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Figure 26: The percentage contribution of original code and the control flow checking
code towards the effective system vulnerability and the execution time with CFCSS
protection.
8.4 Control-Flow Error Detection Using Assertions (CEDA)
Control-Flow Error Detection Using Assertions (CEDA) [42] is the state-of-the-art
technique in the field of software only control flow protection. Figure 27 illustrates
the CEDA detection mechanism. The signature assignment, alongwith the control flow
verification at the start and end of basic blocks, enables CEDA to detect most of the
control flow errors. Through careful selection of software signatures, the techqniue
detects the aliasing errors by maintaining unique signatures for even the aliased basic
blocks. For example, aliasing from B1→B5 is detected by header S5, as shown in
Figure 27(a). Furthermore, the jump check instructions in the signature checking code
header detects the incorrect execution of a conditional branch. Figure 27(b) provides
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Figure 27: Working of control-flow error detection using assertions. The original pro-
gram with five basic blocks (B1∼B5) is shown with the CEDA implementation of
signature-checking code headers and footers (S1∼S5 and S1′ ∼S5′) to detect control
flow errors during its execution. Detection of (i) aliasing errors and (ii) incorrect con-
ditional executions are shown.
an example where an instance of the conditional branch in B6 is supposed to direct the
branch execution to B7, as the condition is true for the particular instance. Instead,
due to soft error, B6→B8 branch is taken. The jump check instructions in the header
of B8, which further checks the condition, will detect such an incorrect branch. Since
the condition in B6 is true for the instance, the variable foo > 0, and the jump check
instruction in B8 which validates if foo > 0 will flag the error.
8.4.1 Experimental Evaluation
Figure 28 shows the results obtained from the experiments with the GemV-CFC frame-
work upon implementation of CEDA.
8.4.1.1 CEDA Ineffective for Processor
CEDA is one of the state-of-the-art techniques in the software based control flow pro-
tection domain and provides mechanisms to detect almost all categories of control flow
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Figure 28: The effective system vulnerability (normalized over original program vul-
nerability) with CEDA.
errors. But GemV-CFC contradicts this claim by showing that CEDA increases vulner-
ability of the system considerably and the situation is worse when compared to CFCSS
or CFCSS+NA.
1. With the implementation of CEDA on commodity processors, system vulnera-
bility increases after protection for most benchmarks (13/14). In fact for gsm-u
benchmark, CEDA increases vulnerability by 55%.
2. On an average, CEDA increases system vulnerability by 21%. The behavior can
be attributed to the fact that CEDA incurs (on average) 38% performance penalty
for software protection, by means of 77% of extra instructions executed.
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3. Here again, the control flow protection technique implemented to protect the
execution of branch instructions requires 236% additional branch executions.
8.5 Control Flow Error Detection and Correction (CFEDC)
Figure 29: Working of CFEDC.
Farazmand et al [10] in their work propose a simple hybrid technique to de-
tect and correct soft errors that occur in the processor pipeline affecting their correct
execution. This process involves two stages: (1) Program Hardening– During compi-
lation, correction data (CD), which is a correction code for the control instruction CI),
is inserted before each control instruction in the program, as shown in Figure 29(b).
The CI is a hamming code of the subsequent branch instruction. The CD is set to be
introduced into the pipeline before the decoding of the control instruction, as shown in
Figure 29(a). (2) Correcting Hardware– The CD from the program is processed by
specialized hardware within the pipeline to detect any errors during the fetch stage of
the control instruction. In the case of a detected error, the Correcting Logic (CL) to-
gether with the Correction Data Register (CDR) is used to introduce the correct control
instruction into the pipeline register of the decode stage.
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8.5.1 Experimental Evaluation
Figure 30: The effective system vulnerability (normalized over original program vul-
nerability) with CFEDC.
Figure 30 shows the results obtained from the experiments using the GemV-
CFC framework upon implementation of CFEDC. On an average, CFEDC increases
the vulnerability of the system by 5%, due to the additional 5% control instructions re-
quired to detect and correct the errors in the fetched branch instructions, before entering
the decode stage.
8.6 Control Flow Checking by Execution Tracing (CFCET)
Rajabzadeh et al [32] propose a method to verify the control flow execution of the
system through the use of an external watchdog processor together with the internal
execution tracing feature (Branch Trace Messaging or BTM [16]) available in commer-
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Figure 31: A typical program with its Program Jumps Graph (PJG) is shown. PJG is
used as a reference graph by the watchdog processor in CFCET.
cial off-the-shelf (COTS) processors (Intel Pentium Family [16]). In this, the technique
traces the program jumps graph (PJG) at run-time and compares with the reference
jumps graph to detect possible violation caused by transient faults. PJG represents
the jump instructions in the program as shown in Figure 31. This graph information is
loaded in the associative memory of the watchdog processor for reference during execu-
tion. An insertion of a branch or a branch target modification causes a mismatch when
compared to this reference PJG, as shown in Figure 32, which leads to the detection of
the control flow error. Note that the branch deletion cannot be detected using CFCET
since the branch deletion causes a non-branch instruction to execute and hence, BTM
cycles wont be generated as BTM cycles are generated only for branch instructions.
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Figure 32: Working of CFCET. Different CFEs and their effects on PJG are shown
here, for example, (a) branch insertion at address 15, (b) branch target modification at
address 10, and (c) branch deletion at address 10.
8.6.1 Experimental Evaluation
Figure 33 shows the results obtained from the GemV-CFC simulations upon imple-
mentation of CFCET. The system vulnerability remains almost the same even after
applying the protection through the execution tracing feature. Although the number of
instructions is unchanged, the extra BTM cycles contribute to the increase in effective
vulnerability, for some of the benchmarks.
8.7 Vulnerability Per Cycle and Vulnerability Per Instruction
Figure 34 presents the effective system vulnerability after protection per cycle and per
instruction normalized over original program vulnerability per cycle and per instruc-
tion respectively, upon implementation of different CFC techniques, averaged over all
the MiBench benchmarks. On an average, there is not much change in vulnerability
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Figure 33: The effective system vulnerability (normalized over original program vul-
nerability) with CFCET.
per cycle compared to the original program for any of the techniques. The experiment
shows that the increase in system vulnerability is proportionate to the increase in exe-
cution cycles for all the CFC techniques, due to the corresponding increased residency
of vulnerable data in processor components.
The software based CFC schemes bring down the vulnerability per instruction
by 16 - 20%, and the hybrid CFP achieves a reduction of 5%, whereas the hardware
based CFP increases the vulnerability per instruction by 9%. The system vulnerability
of the hardware based CFCET technique increases due to the additional BTM cycles
required for the execution tracing, although the number of instructions remain the same
since the tehcnique is hardware based. The reduction in system vulnerability per in-
struction for the software based techniques is due to the fact that the increase in system
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Figure 34: The normalized effective system vulnerability per cycle and per instruction
upon implementation of (a) CFCSS, (b) CFCSS+NA, (c) CEDA, (d) CFEDC, and (e)
CFCET.
vulnerability is offseted by the comparatively higher increase in number of instructions
executed.
8.8 Error Coverage
In the analysis of a soft error protection technique, error coverage is a key metric used
in the justification of its applicability and efficacy. In the case of control flow based
soft error protection techniques, we observe that there does not exist any quantitative
mechanism to measure the error coverage of the proposed technique. Through imple-
mentation of vulnerability measurement of all processor components, protection model
interpretation, and cycle-accurate simulations in our GemV-CFC framework, we are
able to readily analyze the error coverage with quantitative numbers. Figure 35 shows
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the distribution of vulnerability among the processor components for the system core.
In the case of control flow protection techniques, the cache and its components are
always considered protected and beyond the scope of protection. Therefore, for our
coverage analysis, we present the distribution of vulnerability in the processor core
alone. In Figure 35 we see that the pipeline registers (89%) constitute the major vul-
nerability proportion followed by the register file (6.62%), rename table (3.16%) and
then the PC (0.54%).
Figure 35: Vulnerability distribution in the processor components.
As discussed earlier, we observe that control flow based protection techniques
can only protect (or in other words detect errors in) only the PC, the pipeline registers,
the link register and the processor status register. From the vulnerability distribution
graph (Figure 35), we see that the importance of control flow protection techniques
to protect the major vulnerable components in the processor core is valid. However,
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Protection Achieved
Protection PC Pipeline Link Processor Status
Technique Register Register Register
CFCSS 91.03% 0.72% 100% 0%
CFCSS+NA 91.03% 0.73% 100% 0%
CEDA 93.19% 1.07% 100% 100%
CFEDC 12.8% 0.21% 0% 0%
CFCET N/A 0.4% 0% 0%
Table 8: Protection achieved in processor components in the GemV-CFC framework
for the Case Study experiments.
careful quantitative analysis of the said protection techniques reveals a startling revela-
tion. In Table 8 we see that the proportion of protection applied over these vulnerable
components is negligible and contradictory to the requirements of the system. The pro-
tection provided to pipeline registers, across the spectrum of CFC techniques, is mini-
mal. Only software based CFC schemes provide reasonable protection to PC. Note that
the software based CFC techniques are given the benefit of the doubt in case of 100%
protection for link register and CEDA’s 100% protection of processor status register.
Considering the huge proportion of total vulnerability from the pipeline registers, we
see that the effective protection applied here is negligible.
Quantitative analysis of error coverage in the control flow based protection
techniques proposed reveals that only a meagre fraction of the total system vulner-
ability is actually protected by the said techniques, which is in short in-effective in
achieving any level of system level protection from soft errors.
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Chapter 9
DISCUSSION
9.1 Why are Control Flow Checking Mechanisms Ineffective?
We have seen that 33 to 77% of faults can eventually cause a control flow error in the
system. We have identified two cases where faults can trigger control flow errors:
1. Direct sources - Faults in certain processor elements can directly cause a control
flow error. For example, a bit flip in the PC register or in the branch offset field
in the pipeline registers can cause different NPC value to be loaded into the PC
in the next cycle or a subsequent cycle, which can cause a control flow error.
2. Indirect sources - These are faults that occur in some processor elements and
may pass the erroneous value through different components or registers before
eventually turning up as a control flow error. For example, a fault in a register in
the integer RF may cause the value to be used for a comparison, before the con-
ditional branch, in the third read of the register after the fault and the comparison
might evaluate to false instead of the expected value of true (or vice versa). This
erroneous comparison result will trigger a control flow error. Here, the fault was
stored for some time and passed through couple of processor components before
showing up as control flow error and therefore, such processor components are
considered as indirect sources of control flow errors.
Control flow errors due to indirect sources are more common compared to direct sources.
None of the CFC techniques offer protection from control flow errors due to indirect
sources. In order to detect such errors, we believe the redundancy based soft error
detection techniques need to be employed as they verify the computation results at reg-
ular intervals by comparing with redundant duplicate values. The exisitng control flow
checking techniques concentrate mostly on detecting errors due to direct sources and as
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we have seen, they increase the vulnerability of the system and come with performance
overheads. To provide a glimpse of the percentage of control flow errors protected by
CFC techniques, let us consider the case of CFCSS. Let us consider a RISC system,
for which 33% of errors can eventually cause control flow errors. On an average, the
total vulnerability of CFCSS protected applications was found to be 1.55× 1014 bit-
cycles. In this case, 33% or 5.1×1013 bit-cycles can cause control flow errors. Out of
the total vulnerable cycles, only 2.3× 1012 bit-cycles are protected by CFCSS, which
constitutes a meagre 1.34%. Therefore, only 4.04% of possible control flow errors are
protected by CFCSS. This shows the ineffectiveness of CFCSS and attributes it to the
fact that it doesn’t provide error coverage for the indirect sources of control flow errors.
9.2 Alternative Protection Methods
As we can see from Figure 35, the major contributors to the vulnerability of the pro-
cessor core are pipeline registers and register file. There are several existing hardware
based mechanisms that provide better error coverage for these processor components
at the cost of comparable area and power overheads. For example, the C-element latch
scheme [12] provides 99.88% protection for pipeline latches, with an area overhead of
6.4 to 15%, by duplicating the pipeline latches. The Shield technique [24] can selec-
tively protect most vulnerable registers using ECC. Shield reduces the AVF of integer
register file by up to 84% and the floating point register file by up to 100%, with a
minimal area overhead of 10% and a power overhead of 45%. The shielding technique
doesn’t incur any performance penalty. Although these techniques come with some
area and power overheads, they can together provide better protection to the system
than the control flow checking techniques.
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Chapter 10
CONCLUSIONS
Over the years, researchers have motivated for, and also demonstrated the effectiveness
of the proposed control flow protection techniques, for commodity processors with the
help of targeted fault injection experiments and relative performance comparisons. In
our work, we analyze system reliability by means of an accurate, and efficient metric -
vulnerability. We model vulnerability at the system level in a cycle-accurate simulation
environment (gem5), and also integrate methodologies to quantitatively evaluate the
vulnerability of all the components in a processor in the presence of control flow based
protection techniques in our framework, GemV-CFC. For the first time, we derive and
implement a systematic approach to model the protection offered by CFC techniques.
Our evaluation experiments in the form of case studies over state-of-the-art CFC tech-
niques at all levels of computation (hardware, software and hybrid layers) indicate that
control flow based protection techniques are highly ineffective for modern embedded
systems. Although these CFC techniques claim high error coverage and protection,
they fail to provide quantitative evidence to support their claims. Our quantitative anal-
ysis reveals the loop-holes in such implementations and indicates that the proposed
control flow based protection techniques (at the software, hybrid and hardware layers)
are insufficient to protect a system from soft errors. On an average, software based con-
trol flow protection techniques increase the vulnerability of the system by 18 to 21%
and comes with a performance overhead of 17 to 38%. The hybrid techniques increase
the system vulnerability by 5% while incurring a performance penalty of 3.5%. For the
hardware techniques, the system vulnerability remains almost the same, but it comes
with a performance overhead of 9%, notwithstanding the vulnerability of additional
hardware added for their implementations. Our component-wise vulnerability analysis
shows that pipeline registers and register file are the major contributors to the over-
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all system vulnerability, and hence alternative techniques like C-element latch scheme
and Shield together can provide better protection to the processor, with nominal area
overheads and reasonable power overheads. The main drawback of the control flow
checking techniques is that they don’t detect control flow errors caused due to indirect
sources like register file, and provide protection only to errors in direct sources like
pipeline registers, and are ineffective even in providing reasonable protection to these
direct sources.
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